Here is the key section in the report:
Domestically, the largest German banks and insurance companies are highly interconnected. The highest degree of interconnectedness can be found between Allianz, Munich Re, Hannover Re, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Aareal bank, with Allianz being the largest contributor to systemic risks among the publicly-traded German financials. Both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank are the source of outward spillovers to most other publicly-listed banks and insurers. Given the likelihood of distress spillovers between banks and life insurers, close monitoring and continued systemic risk analysis by authorities is warranted.
Among the G-SIBs, Deutsche Bank appears to be the most important net contributor to systemic risks, followed by HSBC and Credit Suisse. In turn, Commerzbank, while an important player in Germany, does not appear to be a contributor to systemic risks globally. In general, Commerzbank tends to be the recipient of inward spillover from U.S. and European G-SIBs. The relative importance of Deutsche Bank underscores the importance of risk management, intense supervision of G-SIBs and the close monitoring of their cross-border exposures, as well as rapidly completing capacity to implement the new resolution regime.
The IMF also said the German banking system poses a higher degree of possible outward contagion compared with the risks it poses internally. This means that in the global interconnected game of counterparty dominoes, if Deutsche Bank falls, everyone else will follow.
Notwithstanding moderate cross-border exposures on aggregate, the banking sector is a potential source of outward spillovers. Network analysis suggests a higher degree of outward spillovers from the German banking sector than inward spillovers. In particular, Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S. have the highest degree of outward spillovers as measured by the average percentage of capital loss of other banking systems due to banking sector shock in the source country.
The IMF concluded that Germany needs to urgently examine whether its bank resolution, i.e., liquidation, plans are operable, including a timely valuation of assets to be transferred, continued access to financial market infrastructures, and whether authorities can ensure control over a bank if resolution actions take a few days, if needed, by imposing a moratorium:
Operationalization of resolution plans and ensuring funding of a bank in resolution is a high priority. The authorities have identified operational challenges (e.g., the timely valuation of assets to be transferred, continued access to financial market infrastructures) and are working to surmount them. In some cases, actions to effect resolution may require a number of days to implement, and the authorities should ensure they can maintain control over the bank during this period, including by using their powers to impose a more general moratorium for a specific bank.
Here is the IMF's chart showing the key linkages of the world's riskiest bank:
And while DB is number 1, here are the other banks whose collapse would likewise lead to global contagion.
Considering two of the three most "globally systemically important", i.e., riskiest, banks just saw their stock price scrape all time lows earlier this week, we wonder just how nervous behind their calm facades are the executives at the ECB, the IMF, and the rest of the handful of people who realize just close to the edge of collapse this world's most riskiest bank (whose market cap is less than the valuation of AirBnB) finds itself right now. | ZERO EDGE
Sin embargo, no todo el mundo es de la misma opinión. Daniel Fernández, Director UFM Market Trends, afirmaba a principios de año que el Deutsche Bank no iba a ser el nuevo Lehman Brothers:
Deutsche Bank no es el nuevo Lehman Brothers, la mayor parte de las pérdidas de 2015 no son estructurales sino puntuales, la cartera de créditos no ha empeorado, y la capitalización y posición de liquidez del banco está en consonancia con la posición de otros gigantes financieros europeos. Sin embargo, el Deutsche Bank si está afrontando graves problemas. El primero, y más importante, es la fuerte disminución de sus ingresos operativos hasta el punto de que actualmente tiene pérdidas estructurales. Adicionalmente, los costes por litigios parece que no van a disminuir en el futuro cercano (Morgan Stanley espera que Deutsche afronte 3900 millones extra durante 2016 y 2017).
Tras él, Daniel Lacalle escribía que ciertamente el 'Deutsche Bank no se parece a Lehman. Pero se parece, como una gran parte de la banca, al sistema financiero japonés':
A muchos no les debería sorprender que Deutsche Bank hable de 2016 como un año difícil, en el que puede volver a tener pérdidas. En esta columna hemos comentado la enorme dificultad con la que se encuentra la banca para crecer en un entorno de baja inflación, bajo crecimiento y tipos negativos (lean) . Además, fue ya hace meses que comentábamos que el horizonte para 2016 era de riesgo de desplome de beneficios bancarios… Eso era cuando pensábamos que el mundo crecería un 3,5% -no un 2,7%- y cuando pensábamos que los tipos iban a ser bajos -no negativos-. La erosión de márgenes por el QE europeo puede tener un impacto medio superior al 12% que comentábamos en el beneficio por acción del sector bancario de 2016. Es prácticamente imposible que el impacto bancario negativo se supla con el 'salvavidas' del TLTRO ¿Por qué? Pérdida de los márgenes generados por el 'carry trade' (compra de deuda soberana a tipos superiores al coste de financiación), reducción de márgenes en nuevos préstamos por bajada de tipos y mayor competencia y diferencial entre activos y pasivos estrechado. Ojo, impacto medio, porque los bancos más afectados sufrirían en un 20-30% de su beneficio por acción, mientras que los menos afectados tendrían un efecto neutral.
